

ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File

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TAB "A"

PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Problem:

1. To estimate the likelihood of the USSR deliberately initiating war during 1952.

Scope:

2. Soviet strategic, political and economic objectives.

3. Soviet courses of action to date to accomplish her strategic, political and economic objectives.

4. Soviet successes

a. Political consolidation of European Satellites

b. Conversion of Satellite industry to meet Soviet requirements

c. Rearmament and increase of strength of Satellite armed forces

d. Soviet industrial development

e. Soviet technological advancement

f. Other

5. Soviet failures

a. Failure at CFM agenda conference at Paris, Spring of 1951

b. Communist failure to drive UN forces from Korea

c. Possible unsatisfactory developments at the Kaesong conference

d. Failure at San Francisco conference

e. Failure to halt Western rearmament including West German

f. Failure to create dissention in NATO

g. Failure of VM to drive French from Indochina

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- h. Continued Yugoslav intransigence
 - i. Failure to block initial steps toward Japanese rearmament
 - j. Behavior of delegates at the youth conference in Berlin, 1951
 - k. Other
6. Factors which might cause Soviets deliberately to go to war:
- a. Increasing Western rearmament including West German
 - b. Increase in U. S. atomic stockpile from one of "scarcity" to one of "plenty"
 - c. Situation in Korea
 - d. Japanese rearmament
 - e. Progress towards U. S. industrial mobilization
 - f. Chinese Communist military demands
 - g. Inclusion of Greece, Turkey, in NATO
 - h. U. S. - Spanish cooperation arrangement
 - i. Military aid to Yugoslavia
 - j. Other
7. Probable Soviet Courses of action:
- a. —
 - b. —
 - c. —
 - .
 - .
- x. Most likely course of action in 1952
8. Conclusion:

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